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Abstract: We study the effect of a declining labor force on the incentives to engage in labor-saving
technical change and ask how this effect is influenced by institutional characteristics of the pen-
sion scheme. When labor is scarcer it becomes more expensive and innovation investments that
increase labor productivity are more profitable. We incorporate this channel in a new dynamic
general equilibrium model with endogenous economic growth and heterogeneous overlapping
generations. We calibrate the model for the US economy and obtain the following results. First,
the effect of a decline in population growth on labor productivity growth is positive and quanti-
tatively significant. In our benchmark, it is predicted to increase from an average annual growth
rate of 1.74% over 1990-2000 to 2.41% in 2100. Second, institutional characteristics of the pension
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system matter both for the growth performance and for individual welfare. Third, the assess-
ment of pension reform proposals may depend on whether economic growth is endogenous or
exogenous.
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1 Introduction
Population aging is one of the major economic challenges for today’s industrialized societies. An
increasing life expectancy in conjunction with declining birth rates tends to reduce the part of the
population in working age and raises the part of the economically dependent old. For instance,
the United Nations predicts for the US an increase in the old-age dependency ratio, i. e., the
ratio of the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged 15-64, from 18% in 2005 to
36% in 2050 (United Nations (2013), medium variant). To meet this challenge it is necessary to
understand the economic consequences of such a demographic change.
This paper studies the economic consequences of the link between demographic changes, pen-
sions, and the incentives of firms to engage in innovation investments that affect total factor
productivity (TFP). With a focus on the US economy and the time span between 1950 and 2200,
we argue that this link may substantially modify the predicted positive and normative implica-
tions of actual policy reform proposals of the pension scheme. We obtain these implications in a
new dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous economic growth and heterogeneous
overlapping generations in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
We calibrate our model for the US economy and establish the following major results. First, we
find that the effect of a decline in population growth on labor productivity growth is positive
and quantitatively significant.1 For instance, under the current pension system it is predicted to
increase from an average annual growth rate of 1.74% over 1990-2000 to approximately 2.41% in
2100. Second, we show that the pension system indeed matters both for the growth performance
of the economy and for the welfare of each generation. Finally, we show that the assessment of
pension reform proposals differs in an endogenous growth framework as opposed to the standard
framework where TFP growth is exogenous and costless.
In times of pronounced population aging, these findings suggest to policymakers that the pres-
sure on a pay-as-you-go pension scheme may be somewhat less severe. Conventional wisdom has
it that the receipts of such a system must decline since the number of contributors falls with the
number of workers. However, the main message of the present paper indicates that this tendency
is at least weakened since labor productivity, wages and, hence, the contributions per worker
1This runs counter to an often held view that reduced population growth leads to lower growth rates of per-capita
income (see, e. g., Bös and von Weizsäcker (1989) for a discussion).
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grow faster. The reason is that firms will respond to the decline in the work force with more
labor-saving investments. In other words, there will be faster endogenous growth. However, our
analysis also shows that the extent to which this channel will materialize hinges crucially on the
institutional characteristics of the pension scheme and, hence, on the way policymakers shape
and adapt it during a demographic transition.
Our analytical framework has a supply side that satisfies two requirements which prove particu-
larly useful when it comes to the identification of the role of endogenous growth for our positive
and normative results. First, endogenous growth is obtained in a competitive neoclassical econ-
omy where TFP growth is the result of labor-saving innovation investments of profit-maximizing
firms and capital accumulation is subject to diminishing returns. Since this economy may readily
be turned into the standard neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) with exogenous and cost-
less technical change there is a natural benchmark. Second, there is a single channel linking the
demographic trend to innovation activities. This parsimony allows for clear-cut intuitions when
we compare policy reform proposals under endogenous and exogenous growth.2
In a broad sense, our research methodology follows the lead of modern macroeconomics and
takes the famous Lucas Critique seriously. This requires an assessment of policy proposals that
accounts for the optimal responses of households and firms. The novel feature of our approach
is that firms are allowed to respond with labor-saving investments to the demographic trend of
population aging.
More precisely, a mechanism often attributed to Hicks (1932) provides the link between the de-
mographic trend and TFP growth. According to Hicks’ argument, a demographic transition that
reduces the labor force may render labor scarcer relative to capital. Accordingly, the relative
price of labor increases and so does the profitability of innovation investments that raise labor
productivity and TFP.3
2We do not want to dispute the possible presence of other channels that may strengthen or weaken the mechanism
expounded here. However, the analytical and the quantitative analysis of such interactions is quite involved. We leave
this question for future research and shall get back to this point in the concluding Section 7.
3Evidence supporting Hicks’ intuition is provided by Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers (1990). These authors’
cross-country regressions establish a negative and significant partial correlation between productivity growth and
labor force growth. In a similar vein, several cross-country growth regressions find a negative and significant partial
correlation between population growth and growth of per-capita GDP (see, e. g., Barro and Sala-ı́-Martin (2004), Kelley
and Schmidt (1995), and Kormendi and Meguire (1985)). Romer (1987) shows a strong inverse relationship between
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However, from a general equilibrium point of view, the relevance of Hicks’ argument hinges on
the economy’s ability to accumulate capital, i. e., on the propensity of a declining population in
working age to save. Hence, to account for the Hicks effect we have to allow firms to adjust
their innovation investments and households to adjust their savings decision to a changing de-
mographic environment. To provide for such an analytical framework we adapt the production
sector of Irmen (2005), which complies with the aforementioned attributes, and combine it with a
household sector comprising heterogeneous overlapping generations of Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987). Since the pension system is a major determinant of an economy’s propensity to save, this
framework is well suited for our comparative institutional analysis that asks how institutional char-
acteristics of the pension scheme affect the incentive to engage in labor-saving technical change
during a demographic transition.
Our research builds on and contributes to a recent and growing literature that extends the seminal
framework of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) to analyze the economic consequences of population
aging in different settings. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature does neither
incorporate the endogenous response of firms to the demographic transition through the Hicks
effect, nor does it provide an analysis of the consequences of policy reforms in endogenous
growth economies.4 The present study is a first step to fill this gap.
Important existing contributions study the consequences of policy reform proposals of the so-
cial security system in closed economies. For instance, Huang, İmrohoroğlu, and Sargent (1997),
Conesa and Krüger (1999), and Fuster, İmrohoroğlu, and İmrohoroğlu (2007) deal with the tran-
sition from an unfunded to a more funded pension scheme, where the latter two emphasize
political economy aspects of such a switch. Closer to our analysis are the studies of İmrohoroğlu,
average annual growth rates of the labor force and of output per hour worked in the US for successive twenty year
intervals covering the 20th century. In a famous study, Habakkuk (1962) uses ideas similar to the Hicksian argument
to explain why technological progress in the 19th century was faster in the US than in Britain.
4Heijdra and Romp (2009a) as well as a previous version of Ludwig, Schelkle, and Vogel (2012) include a calibration
analysis of endogenous growth through endogenous human capital investments of the households and a growth
mechanism along the lines of Lucas (1988). The latter growth mechanism is also at the heart of a theoretical literature
on the link between demographics, pensions, and growth. It includes, e. g., Zhang (1995) emphasizing the role of social
security on fertility, Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) and Zhang and Zhang (2003) with a focus on the effect of different
benefit formula, Sanchez-Losada (2000) and Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal (2005) studying the role of altruism, Boldrin
and Montes (2005) with credit-constrained households, or Echevarria and Iza (2006) with a focus on ageing. However,
these authors do not compare different reform proposals of the pension scheme.
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İmrohoroğlu, and Joines (1995) and de Nardi, İmrohoroğlu, and Sargent (1999) who focus on
reform scenarios within the pay-as-you-go system and assess their welfare implications. With re-
spect to their results, our findings suggests that i) the welfare effects are much larger if economic
growth is endogenous, and ii) the welfare ranking of reform proposals may depend on whether
economic growth is exogenous as in their papers or endogenous as in our study.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and establishes the stationary
equilibrium. Section 3 develops important channels that drive our calibration results in a sim-
plified setting with two-period lived individuals. Section 4 provides the detailed description of
our calibration strategy. Our main findings concerning the interplay between the demographic
transition and economic growth appear in Section 5. In particular, we establish that the feedback
from population growth onto innovation incentives generates faster labor productivity growth.
In Section 6, we turn to the comparative institutional analysis of pay-as-you-go pensions schemes
with different characteristics. Section 6.1 considers three pension reform proposals and studies
their implications for economic growth. Section 6.2 deals with the welfare implications of these
reform proposals. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The latter also
includes some additional material that complements topics dealt with in the main text.
2 The Model
This section describes our large-scale OLG model with heterogeneous agents in the spirit of
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and a production sector extending the setup studied in Irmen
(2005).5
There is a final-good sector and an intermediate-good sector. Intermediate-good firms undertake
innovation investments that increase the productivity of their workers. These productivity gains
drive the evolution of the economy’s level of technological knowledge and its TFP. Intermediates
and capital produce final output that can be consumed or invested. If invested, the current final
good may either serve as future capital or as an input in innovation investments. In each period,
prices are expressed in units of the current final good.
5The production side of Irmen (2005) extends the one of Hellwig and Irmen (2001), which in turn builds on Bester
and Petrakis (2003).
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The government collects taxes, accidental bequests, and social security contributions. In all peri-
ods, the budget of the government and the one of the pension scheme are balanced.
2.1 Demographics and Timing
A period, t, corresponds to one year. At each t, a new generation of households is born. Newborns
have a real life age of 20 denoted by s = 1. All generations retire at age 65 (s = R = 46) and live
up to a maximum age of 94 (s = J = 75). At t, all agents of age s survive until age s + 1 with
probability φt,s where φt,0 = 1 and φt,J = 0.
Let Nt(s) denote the number of agents of age s at t. The population Nt(s) of the periods t =
0, 1, ..., 450 is calibrated as the actual and predicted US population of the years 1950 to 2400 using
the data of Krüger and Ludwig (2007).
2.2 Households
Each household comprises one worker. Households maximize intertemporal utility at the begin-










where β > 0 denotes the discount factor, and per-period utility u(c, l) is a function of consumption





1− θ , θ > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1). (2)
Households are heterogeneous with regard to their age, s, their individual labor efficiency, e(s, j),
and their wealth, ω. We stipulate that an agent’s efficiency e(s, j) = ȳsεj depends on its age,
s ∈ S ≡ {1, 2, ..., 75}, and its efficiency type, εj ∈ E ≡ {ε1, ε2}. We choose the age-efficiency
profile, {ȳs}, in accordance with the US wage profile. The permanent efficiency types ε1 and ε2
are meant to capture differences in education and ability. We use Γ to denote the unique invariant
distribution of εj ∈ E .
The net wage income in period t of an s-year old household with efficiency type j is given by
(1− τw − τb,t)wte(s, j)lt(s), where wt denotes the wage rate per efficiency unit in period t. The
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wage income is taxed at the constant rate τw. Furthermore, the worker has to pay contributions
to the pension system at rate τb,t which may vary over time depending on the pension scheme.
A retired worker receives pensions b(s, j) that depend on his efficiency type j. Clearly, b(s, j) = 0
for s < R.
Households are born without assets at the beginning of age s = 1, hence ωt(1) = 0. Parents do
not leave bequests to their children, and all accidental bequests are confiscated by the government.
The household earns interest rt on his wealth ωt ∈ R. Capital income is taxed at the constant rate
τr. In addition, households receive lump-sum transfers trt from the government. As a result, the
budget constraint at t of an s-year old household with productivity type j and wealth ωt is:
bt(s, j) + (1− τw − τb,t)wte(s, j)lt(s) + [1 + (1− τr)rt]ωt(s) + trt
= ct(s) + ωt+1(s + 1).
(3)
2.3 Firms
Firms belong either to the final-good or to the intermediate-good sector. Both sectors are compet-
itive.
2.3.1 Final Goods
The measure of all final-good firms is equal to one. At each t, firms produce output, Yt, according
to the following Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = Kαt X
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1, (4)
where Kt is the capital input at t and Xt denotes the amount of the intermediate good used in
period-t production. Let pt denote the price of the intermediate good at t, and δ ∈ [0, 1] the rate
at which capital depreciates within periods. Firms rent capital from households and return 1 + rt
units of their output per unit of rented capital. Moreover, they pay ptXt to the intermediate-goods
producers. Hence, per-period profits are
Yt − rtKt − ptXt − δKt. (5)
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Firms take the sequence of prices {rt, pt} as given and maximize the sum of the present dis-
counted values of profits in all periods. This is equivalent to a series of one-period maximization
problems and gives rise to the first-order conditions
∂Yt
∂Kt
= rt + δ = αK̃α−1t , (6)
∂Yt
∂Xt
= pt = (1− α)K̃αt , (7)
where K̃t ≡ Kt/Xt denotes the capital intensity in the final-good sector in period t.
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods
The set of all intermediate-good firms is represented by the set R+ of nonnegative real numbers
with Lebesgue measure.
Technology All firms have access to the same technology and face a capacity limit of 1.6 The






where at and ldt denote the firm’s labor productivity and its labor input, respectively. Firms
hire effective labor, ldt , defined as the product of the efficiency factor e(s, j) and the ‘number’ of
working hours lt(s). Labor is assumed to be divisible between firms.
The individual firm’s labor productivity at t depends on both the indicator of the economy-wide
level of labor productivity At−1 of period t − 1 and its individual productivity growth rate qt
according to
at = At−1(1 + qt). (9)
In order to achieve productivity growth at rate qt, the firm must invest i(qt) units of the final
good in period t− 1. The input requirement function is given by
i(q) = v0q, with v0 > 0. (10)
6The capacity limit of 1 is a shortcut that has no bearing on the evolution of any magnitude of interest in the present
model. It may be endogenized along the lines set out in Hellwig and Irmen (2001).
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Following Hellwig and Irmen (2001), the innovation reflected in at is proprietary knowledge of the
firm only for production in period t; afterwards it becomes common knowledge. A consequence
of this assumption is that an intermediate-good firm can produce at t with a technology involving
at = At−1 if it decides not to undertake an innovation investment in t− 1. The evolution of At
over time is described below.
Profit Maximization and Zero-Profits A firm’s innovation investment fully depreciates after one
year. Therefore, the cost of an innovation investment undertaken at t− 1 in units of the final good
at t is (1 + rt)i(qt). With wtldt denoting a firm’s wage bill, a production plan {xt, ldt , qt} for period
t yields the profit
πt = pt xt − wt ldt − (1 + rt) i(qt). (11)
Firms take the sequence of real prices {pt, wt, rt} as well as the sequence of aggregate productivity
indicators {At−1} as given and maximize the sum of the present discounted values of profits in
all periods. Since production choices for different periods are independent of each other, for each
t they choose the plan {xt, ldt , qt} to maximize the profits πt of (11).
If a firm innovates then it incurs an investment cost (1 + rt) i(qt) that is independent of the level
of output. Hence, an innovation investment can only be profit-maximizing if the margin per unit
of output is strictly positive, i. e., pt − wt/at > 0. Since this margin is independent of the amount
of produced output, an innovating firm produces the capacity output xt = 1. Accordingly, (8)





Upon substitution of the latter in (11), the profit-maximizing productivity growth rate is






− (1 + rt) i(q)
]
. (13)
The corresponding first-order condition balances the advantage of a lower wage bill and the
disadvantage of a higher investment cost. It is sufficient for a maximum and given by
wt
At−1(1 + q̂t)2
≤ (1 + rt) v0, (14)
with strict inequality only if q̂t = 0.
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This condition shows that, indeed, the incentive to engage in labor saving innovation investments
depends on (relative) factor prices. If firms face a higher wage, then, ceteris paribus, an increase
in q implies a larger reduction in the wage bill. Similarly, a higher real interest rate reduces
innovation incentives since, ceteris paribus, it raises marginal investment costs. This is the sense
in which profit-maximizing firms adjust their innovation investments to changing factor prices as
conjectured by Hicks: if wt/(1 + rt), i. e., the relative price of labor, increases they invest more.
However, since the input requirement for the first marginal unit of qt is not infinitesimally small,
firms may find it optimal not to innovate if the relative price of labor is too small.
To complete the analysis of the profit maximum, we must consider the case where a firm’s margin
is not strictly positive, i. e., pt ≤ wt/at. Then, the firm will not invest. In case of a zero-margin,
any plan (xt, lt, 0) with xt ∈ [0, 1] and lt = xt/At−1 maximizes πt. Without loss of generality and
to simplify the notation, we assume for this case that intermediate-good firms still produce the
capacity output. If a firm faces a strictly negative margin, it won’t produce and (0, 0, 0) is the
optimal plan.
Denote nt the measure of the set of all active firms in the intermediate-good sector at t. Since
all firms have access to the same technology and face identical prices, all active firms choose the
same production plan {1, 1/ (At−1 (1 + q̂t)) , q̂t}.
In equilibrium, active intermediate-good firms must earn zero profits, i. e.,7
πt (q̂t; pt, wt, rt, At−1) = 0. (15)
2.3.3 Consolidating the Production Sector
The following lemma shows that the conditions for profit-maximization and zero-profits in the
final-good and the intermediate-good sector relate the growth rate of labor productivity qt to the
capital intensity in the final-good sector, K̃t.
7This follows since the labor supply in each period is bounded. Therefore, the set of producing intermediate-good
firms that employ more than some ε > 0 units of effective labor must have bounded measure, i. e., it must be smaller
than the set of all intermediate-good firms. Since inactive intermediate-good firms must be maximizing profits just
like active ones, we need that maximum profits of intermediate-good firms at equilibrium prices are equal to zero. See
Hellwig and Irmen (2001) for more details.
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Lemma 1 If all firms in the economy maximize profits and earn zero-profits, i. e., equations (6), (7), (14)


















Lemma 1 provides the link between the equilibrium incentive to innovate and the capital intensity.
Intuitively, profit-maximization in the final-good sector as stated in (6) and (7) means that a
higher K̃t lowers the real interest rate and raises the price of the intermediate good. Both price





reflects the effect of these price movements onto the profit-maximizing level
of innovation activity implied by (14). We shall later see that in equilibrium the capital intensity,
K̃t, is a measure of the relative abundance of capital with respect to effective labor. Thus, Lemma 1
links the relative abundance of factors to innovation incentives as envisaged by Hicks: if capital
is abundant relative to effective labor then the incentive to engage in labor-saving innovation
investments is high. As mentioned above, the input requirement for the first marginal unit of qt
is not infinitesimally small. Therefore, profit-maximization and zero-profits of intermediate-good
firms are only compatible with qt > 0 if pt/(1 + rt) is sufficiently high, i. e., if K̃t > K̃ct .
Turning to the evolution of the economy-wide indicator of technological knowledge, we assume
that At = max{at(n) = At−1 (1 + qt(n)) | n ∈ [0, nt]}. Since in equilibrium the productivity of all
producing intermediate-good firms is at = At−1(1 + qt), we have At = at and
At = At−1 (1 + qt). (16)
Moreover, in equilibrium the aggregate demand for innovation investment at t− 1 is nti(qt), the
aggregate demand for effective labor at t is ntldt = nt/ (At−1 (1 + qt)), and the aggregate supply
of the intermediate good at t is nt.
2.4 Government
The government collects income taxes Tt in order to finance its expenditure on government con-
sumption Gt and transfers Trt. In addition, it confiscates all accidental bequests Beqt. The gov-
ernment budget is balanced in every period t, i. e.,
Gt + Trt = Tt + Beqt. (17)
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In view of the tax rates τw and τr, the government’s tax revenue is
Tt = τwwtLt + τrrtΩt, (18)
where Ωt is aggregate wealth at t.
Government spending is a constant fraction of final-good output
Gt = ḡ Yt. (19)
2.5 Social Security
The social security system is a pay-as-you-go system. The social security authority collects con-
tributions from the workers to finance its pension payments to the retired agents. Pensions are a
constant fraction of the net labor income of the productivity type j
bt(s, j) =
 0 s < Rζ(1− τw − τb,t)wtεj l̄t s ≥ R, (20)
where l̄t denotes the average hourly labor supply of all workers in period t.
In equilibrium, the social security budget is balanced and will be defined below. As to the insti-
tutional characteristics of the pension scheme we will distinguish three different policy scenarios
that will become effective in period t0:8
1. constant replacement rate: ζt ≡ bt(1−τw−τb)wt l̄t = ζ,
2. constant contribution rate starting in period t0: τb,t = τb,t0 for t ≥ t0,
3. constant replacement rate and later retirement at age 70, i. e. R = 51.
Under the first policy, the pension benefits of the retired worker with productivity type j remain
constant relative to the average wage income of all type-j workers. Moreover, the contribution
8In our computations t0 corresponds to the year 2010. Prior to this period, the contribution rate τb,t adjusts in every
period t to balance the social security budget. For computational reasons, we will assume below that the economy is
in steady state during all periods t < t−1. All generations born between period t−1 and t0 adjust their behavior in line
with the anticipated policy changes. In our computation, t−1 corresponds to the year 1950.
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rate τb,t adjust in every period t to balance the social security budget. The second policy has
a constant contribution rate τb,t after period t0. Accordingly, pension benefits adjust to keep the
social security budget balanced. Under the third pension policy, the pension benefits of the retired
workers remain constant relative to the wage income of all type-j workers, and workers have to
be active for an additional 5 years. As under the first policy, the pension contribution rate τb,t
adjusts to balance the social security budget. However, the contribution rate can be much lower
here, since, on average, the contribution period is longer and the benefit period is shorter.
2.6 Stationary Equilibrium
In the stationary equilibrium, individual behavior is consistent with the aggregate behavior of
the economy, firms maximize profits, households maximize intertemporal utility, and factor and
goods’ markets clear. To express the equilibrium in terms of stationary variables only, we have to
divide aggregate quantities by Xt and individual variables and prices by At. Therefore, we define





































Let ft denote the cross-section measure of households in period t.
A stationary equilibrium for a government policy {τr, τw, τb,t, ḡ, ζt, trt}, an initial value A0 > 0, and
initial measures f0 in period 0 corresponds to a price system, an allocation, and a sequence of
aggregate productivity indicators {At} that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Population grows at the rate λt =
Nt+1
Nt − 1.
2. The ‘number’ of intermediate-good firms, nt, is equal to the total output of intermediates
as each firms produces one unit of output, xt = 1
nt = Xt. (21)
3. The aggregate productivity indicator, At evolves according to (16).
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4. Labor market equilibrium: Aggregate effective labor supply, Lt, is equal to the aggregate
labor demand of all intermediate-good firms
Lt = ntldt . (22)
5. Capital market equilibrium: aggregate wealth is equal to aggregate capital plus aggregate
innovation investment
Ωt = Kt + ntit(qt).
6. Households maximize the intertemporal utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) and
l ∈ [0, 1]. This gives rise to standard first-order conditions for c̃t(s) and lt(s). Moreover,
there is a transversality condition requiring ωt (J + 1) = 0.
As a result, for each period t individual labor supply lt(ω̃, s, j), consumption c̃t(ω̃, s, j) and
optimal next period assets ω̃′t(ω̃, s, j) are functions of the individual state variables ω̃, j, and
s. Moreover, they also depend on t.
7. Firms maximize profits satisfying (6), (7) and (14). In equilibrium, firm profits are zero.
Using (16), the zero-profit condition (15) can be rewritten as follows
w̃t = (1− α)K̃αt − (1 + rt)i(qt). (23)
8. Aggregate variables are equal to the sum of the individual variables
Lt =
∫
e(s, j)lt(ω̃, s, j) ft(dω̃× ds× dj),





















c̃t(ω̃, s, j) ft(dω̃× ds× dj),
T̃t = τww̃t + τrrt(K̃t + i(qt)).




= T̃t + B̃eqt. (24)
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b̃t(s, j) ft(dω̃× ds× dj) = τb,tw̃t, (25)
11. The market for the final good clears.
12. The cross-sectional measure ft evolves as




(ω̃, s, j), W̃ × S × E
)
ft(dω̃× ds× dj)
for all sets W̃ , S , E , where the Markov transition function Pt is given by
Pt
(




φt(s) if ω̃′t(ω̃, s, j) ∈ W̃ ,
j ∈ E , s + 1 ∈ S
0 else,
and for the newborns
ft+1(W̃ × 1× E) = Nt+1(1) ·

Γ(E) if 0 ∈ W̃
0 else.
3 Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth in a Sim-
plified Setting
In this section, we show that the relationship between population growth and endogenous eco-
nomic growth depends on the characteristics of the pay-as-you-go pension scheme. We make this
point in a simplified setting that combines the production sector of Section 2.3 with a household
sector à la Diamond (1965). We establish the existence of a steady state and study the steady-state
response of the economy’s growth rate to a decline in its population growth rate. We find that
the rise of the steady-state growth rate caused by a decline in population growth is larger under
a pension scheme that keeps the contribution rate constant than under a scheme with a constant
replacement rate. We shall see in Section 6 that the calibration exercises bring out these qualitative
findings, too.
Consider two-period lived households. Generations comprise homogeneous individuals. The
labor supply when young is exogenous and normalized to one, the one when old is zero. The
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population growth rate, λ, is constant over time and coincides with the growth rate of aggregate
labor supply, i. e., λ = Lt+1/Lt − 1.
3.1 Households and the Pay-As-You-Go Pension Scheme
Lifetime utility of a member of cohort t is
ln cyt + β ln c
o
t+1, β ∈ (0, 1), (26)
where cyt and c
o
t+1 denote per-capita consumption when young and old, respectively. The maxi-
mization of (26) is subject to the per-period budget constraints
cyt + st = (1− τb)wt, and cot+1 = st(1 + rt+1) + bt+1, (27)












First, we consider a pay-as-you-go system with a constant contribution rate τb ∈ (0, 1). Leaving
intragenerational heterogeneity and taxes on wage income aside, the benefits at t + 1 implied by
the balanced budget satisfy bt+1 Lt = Lt+1τb wt+1 such that
bt+1 = (1 + λ) τb wt+1. (29)
3.2 The Dynamical System
We use K̃t as the state variable of the dynamical system. To express the savings of the young as a
function of this state variable we employ Lemma 1 to find the equilibrium real wage as




















Accordingly, a rise in the capital intensity K̃t affects the wage in three ways. First, a higher K̃t
raises the marginal product of the intermediate good (see equation 7). Second, a rise in K̃t renders
labor scarcer such that the productivity growth rate g(K̃t) rises. Third, faster productivity growth
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increases investment outlays. The first two channels increase the wage, the last can be shown to
decrease it. Observe that (30) gives the same real wage as for a neoclassical production sector




= g > 0 and i(.) = 0.







)) = K̃αt − α K̃α−1t (K̃t + i (g (K̃t))) ≡ w̃ (K̃t) . (31)
In these units, the real wage at t is equal to the difference between final-good output and overall
debt service payments per unit of effective labor, respectively.
In equilibrium, the savings of the young must be equal to aggregate investment, i. e.,
st Lt = Kt+1 + nt+1 i (qt+1) . (32)
Using Lemma 1, optimal savings (28), the budget of the pension scheme (29), equilibrium wages
(30) for periods t and t + 1, and the full employment condition (22) in (32) gives the equation of





























(1 + β)(1 + λ)
∈ (0, 1), (34)









∈ (0, 1). (36)
The dynamical system of the economy is given by (33) in conjunction with an initial value K̃0 > 0.
The three statements of the following theorem establish the key results that we need for the
analysis of the link between population, pensions, and endogenous economic growth. For ease
of exposition, we state and prove the theorem assuming particular parameter values which are
sufficient but by no means necessary for the results.
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Theorem 1 Let δ = 1 and α = 1/2.








> 0 for all K̃t > K̃c.




> K̃c if v0 < (ξ1/ξ2)
2.
3. There is a function K̃∗ = K̃∗ (λ, τb) with ∂K̃∗/∂λ < 0 and ∂K̃/∂τb < 0.
Statement 1 assures a unique equilibrium value K̃t+1 given K̃t in the regime with strictly positive
innovation investments. Statement 2 assures the existence of at least one locally stable steady
state. Hence, without a closed form solution at hand, the focus of our analysis on steady-state
effects is admissible.
The comparative statics of Statement 3 reveal that faster population growth and a higher con-
tribution rate reduce the steady-state capital intensity. Intuitively, in a steady state savings per
unit of effective labor are such that all generations are equipped with the same amount of capital
and innovation investments per unit of effective labor. Moreover, since the steady state is locally
stable, an increase in K̃∗ augments savings per unit of effective labor by less than the investment
needs per unit of effective labor. Then, a higher population growth rate has two reinforcing ef-
fects on K̃∗. First, it increases the amount of aggregate investments necessary to maintain a given
steady-state capital intensity. Given savings per unit of effective labor this reduces K̃∗ (Solow
effect). Second, savings per unit of effective labor falls since, ceteris paribus, faster population
growth means a higher pension benefit in accordance with (29). The second finding of State-
ment 3 follows from the observation that the contribution rate affects the individual incentive to
save through the well-known income effects. An increase in τb means a lower net wage when
young and a higher benefit when old. Both effects reduce savings per unit of effective labor. If
such a hike occurs in a locally stable steady state the value of K̃∗ must fall.
Finally, observe that the steady-state growth rate of all per-capita magnitudes in this economy




. This follows from Lemma 1, the updating condition (16), and the equi-
librium conditions for the intermediate good market and for the labor market, (21) and (22),
respectively. Equilibrium output at t becomes Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
1−α such that output per worker at







3.3 Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth
What is the effect of population growth on the steady-state growth rate of the economy? It
turns out that the answer depends on particular properties of the pension scheme. The following
proposition has the result for the pension scheme with a constant contribution rate discussed
above.
Proposition 1 Suppose the economy is in a locally stable steady state K̃∗ > K̃c. If the pension system has










Hence, a decline in the population growth rate increases the steady-state growth rate of the
economy, q∗. The intuition is straightforward. According to Statement 3 of Theorem 1 a decline in
the population growth rate implies a higher steady-state capital intensity (Solow effect). Moreover,
in accordance with Lemma 1, the increased relative scarcity of labor means faster productivity
growth (Hicks effect).
Next, we consider the same economy except that the pay-as-you-go pension system stipulates a
constant replacement rate and not a constant contribution rate. How does the steady-state growth
rate of such an economy respond to a demographic change?
Consider, in accordance with (25), a constant replacement rate ζ ∈ (0, 1) that ties the benefit when
old to the net wage of the current young, i. e.,
bt+1 = ζ wt+1(1− τ̂b,t+1), (38)
where τ̂b,t+1 adjusts such that the budget of the pension scheme is balanced. The ˆ -notation
distinguishes the contribution rate under a constant replacement rate from τb of the constant-
contribution-rate case. At all t the contribution rate consistent with a balanced budget of (29) and
(38) satisfies (1 + λ)τ̂b,t = ζ (1− τ̂b,t), or, suppressing the time argument, we have
τ̂b =
ζ
ζ + 1 + λ







Since the population growth rate is constant, so is the contribution rate. Faster population growth
reduces the dependency ratio such that a given replacement rate can be supported with a lower
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contribution rate. A higher replacement rate requires a higher contribution rate. On the one hand,
such an increase reduces benefits when old, on the other hand, it increases the contributions paid
by the young.
Another important implication of (39) is that Statement 1 and 2 of Theorem 1 also apply here.
Indeed, given K̃0 > 0 the evolution described by the dynamical system of (33) is the same under
a constant contribution rate and under a constant replacement rate if the right-hand sides of (29)
and (38) are equal, i. e., if
(1 + λ)τb = ζ(1− τ̂b). (40)
Statement 3 of Theorem 1 needs to be modified. In view of (39) the relationship between the





∂K̃∗ (λ, τ̂b (λ, ζ))
∂λ
+





According to Theorem 1 and (39), all three partial derivatives are negative. Hence, the overall
effect of a decline in population growth on the steady-state capital intensity is ambiguous. The
reason is to be found in the relationship between changes in the population growth rate and the
incentive to save. Under a fixed contribution rate, a decline in population growth reduces the
expected pension benefit (see, (29)). Accordingly, savings increase. Under a constant replacement
rate this effect is weakened since a lower population growth rate also raises the contribution
rate. Indeed, from (29) and (39), we have bt+1 = (1 + λ) τ̂b (λ, ζ) wt+1 ≡ bt+1 (λ, τ̂b (λ, ζ) , wt+1).
Therefore, dbt+1/dλ = ∂bt+1/∂λ + (∂bt+1/∂τ̂b) (∂τ̂b (λ, ζ) /∂λ), where the first term is positive
and the second is negative. Of course, (38) implies that the overall effect remains positive such
that the incentive to save is weaker. Moreover, since a higher contribution reduces the net wage
of the current young, they also save less.
As to the effect of population growth on the steady-state growth rate of the economy under a
constant replacement rate we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 Consider an economy in a locally stable steady state K̃∗ > K̃c. If the pension system has a
constant replacement rate, then q∗ = g
(
K̃∗ (λ, τ̂b (λ, ζ))
)







Proposition 2 holds since the direct effect of λ on K̃ in (41) dominates the indirect effect through
τ̂b such that the overall effect is negative. Hence, under a constant replacement rate we expect
the economy’s steady-state growth rate to increase following a decline in the population growth
rate just as under a constant contribution rate. However, according to the following proposition,
the strength of the steady-state response of the economy’s growth rate to a demographic change
depends on the institutional design of its pension scheme.
Proposition 3 Consider an economy in a locally stable steady state K̃∗ > K̃c. Suppose (40) is satisfied






K̃∗ (λ, τ̂b (λ, ζ))
)
. Then, the impact of a permanent decline in the
population growth rate on the steady-state growth rate is greater under a constant contribution rate than








Hence, the prediction is that a decline in the population growth rate increases the steady-state
growth rate of the economy by more if the pension scheme keeps the contribution rate constant.
The necessary increase of the contribution rate under a constant replacement rate discourages
savings. Hence, the induced change in K̃∗ will be less pronounced. We shall confirm this result
in our evaluation of the quantitative model in Section 6 (see, in particular Figure 5).
4 Calibration Strategy
In this section, we describe our calibration of the model parameters.
4.1 Demographics
Our projection of the US population demographics for 1950-2050 is taken from United Nations
(2002). The forecast for the US population development until 2400 is taken from Krüger and Lud-
wig (2007). These projections are based on the assumptions that life time expectancy increases at
constant rates until the year 2100 and that the number of newborns is constant after 2200. Figure 1
illustrates the time profile of the population growth rate 1950-2400.9 We take this evolution as
exogenous and study the consequences for economic growth, pensions, and welfare.
9The depicted growth rates are computed for the population aged 20-94 in compliance with our model of Section 2.
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Figure 1: Actual and Predicted US Population Growth Rates
4.2 Endowments and Preferences
We choose the discount factor β = 1.011 in accordance with the empirical estimates of Hurd (1989)
who explicitly accounts for mortality risk.10 For our choice of β, the real interest rate before taxes
amounts to 6.96% (6.59%) during 1980-2005 (at the end of the demographic transition). We set
the coefficient of risk aversion θ = 2.0. The parameter γ = 0.32 of the utility function is calibrated
so that the average labor supply of the workers is approximately 0.30.
The s-year old household of type j has the productivity e(s, j) = ȳsεj. The age-efficiency profile
{ȳs}45s=1 is taken from Hansen (1993), interpolated to in-between years and normalized to one.
For those aged 65 - 69, we linearly extrapolated the data of Hansen (1993). The set of the equally
distributed productivity types {ε1, ε2} = {0.57, 1.43} is taken from Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2004). With this calibration, we are able to replicate the empirical distribution of US wages. In our
model, the Gini coefficient of the wage distribution is equal to 0.301 which compares favorably
with empirical values reported by, e. g., Dı́az-Giménez, Quadrini, and Rı́os-Rull (1997).
10Related research that uses such a value for β includes İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu, and Joines (1995) and Huggett
(1996). In the literature, the discount factor β has often been set smaller than one. Therefore, we provide a detailed
sensitivity analysis for β = 0.99 in Heer and Irmen (2009). Besides an unrealistically high interest rate both our
qualitative and our quantitative results remain virtually unaffected.
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4.3 Production
The labor income share and the depreciation rate are set in accordance with Prescott (1986) im-
plying the values α = 0.35 and δ = 0.08, respectively. The labor income (capital income) share
in our model amounts to 64.0% (35.0%), while research expenditure relative to GDP are equal to
1.0%.11 The parameter v0 is set equal to 0.93 implying an average annual total factor productivity
growth rate of 1.05% over the years 1980-2005 which corresponds to the US experience.
4.4 Government
The government share ḡ = G/Y is set equal to the average ratio of government consumption
in GDP, ḡ = 0.195 in the US during 1959-93 according to the Economic Report of the President
(1994). The tax rates τw = 24.8% and τr = 42.9% are computed as the average values of the
effective US tax rates over the time period 1965-88 that are reported by Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994). The pension net replacement rate ζ = 0.50 is taken from İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu,
and Joines (1995). Government transfers, tr, and the social security contribution rate, τb, are
computed using the equilibrium condition of the government budget (17) and the social security
budget (25).
4.5 Computation of the Transition Dynamics
To compute the transition dynamics presented in the next section, we assume that the US econ-
omy attains a new steady state with zero population growth in the year 2400.12 In addition, we
assume an arbitrary steady state with 1.1% population growth in the year 1950. Given that we
simulate the economy starting in 1950, the initialization is found to have a small effect on the
transition after 2000.
In a first step, we make an initial guess of the time path of {K̃t, l̄t, τb,t, t̃rt, qt}t=2400t=1950. We iterate
backwards in time and compute the household decisions of the newborn generation in each
11One reason why the fraction of research expenditure in GDP is relatively small is that the model does not explicitly
account for above average salaries of researchers.
12In fact, the deviation of the steady-state capital intensity in 2400 from the computed capital intensity at the end of
the transition in period 2399 is less than 0.001%. Details on the transition until 2400 are given in the Appendix.
22
period t = 2400, 2399, . . . , 1950.13 In each period, we aggregate savings of all generations and




t, qit}. We update the time path using the Gauss-Seidel-
Quasi-Newton algorithm presented by Ludwig (2007). In particular, we use the derivatives of the
final steady-state equilibrium conditions with respect to K̃, l̄, τb, t̃r, and q to initialize the Jacobian
matrix in the Broyden algorithm. Moreover, we solve the model blockwise by first solving the
transition for {K̃1t }t=2400t=1950 given the initial guess {l̄0t , τ0b,t, t̃r0t , q0t }. In the next step, we solve the
transition for {l̄1t } given the remaining variable values {K̃1t , τ0b,t, t̃r0t , q0t } and so forth. When we
tried to solve the model for all endogenous aggregate variables simultaneously, the program did
not converge. Therefore, computational time is considerable and amounts to several hours on a
Pentium III, 860 MHz, for an accuracy chosen to be equal to 10−5 for both the individual decision
rules and the time path of the endogenous aggregate variables.
5 Demographic Transition and Economic Growth
In this section we study the evolution of the US economy implied by the demographic transition
depicted in Figure 1. As to the pension scheme we assume a constant pension replacement rate
equal to ζ = 50% such that the social security contribution rate τb,t adjusts to balance the budget
of the social security system. We refer to this setup as the benchmark economy. In the following
analysis, we establish and interpret the evolution of the labor force, the capital intensity, the factor
prices, and the growth rate of technological knowledge, q, for the period 1950-2200.
The transition from 1950 until 2200 is graphed in Figures 2 and 3 for the benchmark economy.
As the population ages, the share of the working age population falls from 88% in 1950 to 67%
in 2200. Therefore, the contribution rate to the social security system τb,t increases from 5.1% to
14.8%.
The dynamics of the capital intensity, K̃ = K/AL, seems to reflect the evolution of the labor
force share; as the aggregate effective labor supply, L, declines, K̃ increases. However, the capital
intensity is also influenced by general equilibrium effects that impinge on, e. g., the ability and
willingness of a declining labor force to save and the evolution of the level of technological knowl-
13To compute the individual household problem, we have to solve a non-linear equation system in two variables
which are the capital stocks of the 21-year old households with productivity ε1 and ε2, respectively. The methods are
described in more detail in Heer and Maussner (2009).
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Figure 2: Transition in the Benchmark Economy, Results I
edge, A. Overall, the capital intensity is predicted to increase over time, though the evolution is
not monotonic. The dynamics of factor prices reflects the one of the capital intensity; while the
real wage rate w increases in K̃, the real interest rate r falls.
Since the growth rate of technological knowledge is tied to the capital intensity by the monotonic




, the evolution of q mimics the one of K̃. The lower right diagram in Figure 2
shows that qt increases from an average rate of 1.63% during 1980-2005 to 2.41% in 2100. As
we approach the steady state after 2200, qt rises even further.14 In the steady state q∗ = 2.52%
is constant and coincides with the growth rate of labor productivity, TFP, and all per-capita
variables.
Hence, as our first main result, we conclude that the demographic transition is associated with
14All endogenous variables of the model like the capital stock per capita or the aggregate effective labor supply per
capita stabilize around the year 2200. Indeed, in 2200 the transition is almost complete. The entire transition of K̃t and
qt until the year 2400 is shown in Figure 7 in Appendix 8.2.
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Figure 3: Transition in the Benchmark Economy, Results II
an economically significant increase of the long-run growth rate of labor productivity from an
average annual growth rate over 1990-2000 of 1.74% by 0.78 percentage points.
We may use these observations to shed some light on the sources of labor productivity growth.
From Lemma 1, the updating condition (16), and the equilibrium conditions for the intermediate
good market and for the labor market, (21) and (22), respectively, we find the equilibrium output
at t to equal Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
1−α. Then, output per effective hour worked at t may be written as
Yt/Lt = K̃αt At. Suppressing time subscripts and denoting the growth rate of some variable x by
gx, the growth rate of Y/L at all t is





Hence, growth of labor productivity has two sources. First, there is the direct contribution of
growth in K̃, second there is the indirect contribution of K̃ on the growth of technological knowl-
edge. As population and effective labor decline, both channels contribute to the growth of labor
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, i. e., the Hicks effect, is quantitatively much
larger. For instance, the model predicts average annual growth rates of labor productivity and
technological knowledge between 2000 and 2100 of 2.23% and 2.22%, respectively. Accordingly,
growth in Y/L is almost entirely due to the Hicks effect.
6 Population, Pensions, and Growth
In the previous section, we found that a decline in the population growth rate increases the
growth rate of technological knowledge. In this section, we ask whether and how the design of
the pension system affects this result. In Section 6.1 the focus is on possible growth effects. Since
faster growth is no end in itself, Section 6.2 turns to the comparison of individual welfare under
different designs of the pension scheme.
6.1 Comparative Analysis of Pension Reform Proposals
We consider the three policy scenarios of the pay-as-you-go pension scheme already introduced
in Section 2:
1. constant replacement rate, i. e., ζt = bt(1−τw−τb)wt l̄t = ζ = 50%. This is the benchmark econ-
omy (solid line in the following figures),
2. constant contribution rate after 2010 (broken line). More precisely, the contribution rate
adjusts until 2010 before it remains constant at the level of τb = 7.0%. We assume that this
policy change is fully anticipated by all economic agents.15
3. constant replacement rate and later retirement at age 70, i. e., R = 51, for those agents born
in 2010 and afterwards (dotted line).
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of the US economy for the three pension reform scenarios under
endogenous growth. In the scenarios 1 and 3 (2), the contribution rate τb (the replacement rate
of the pensions ζ) adjusts in order to balance the social security budget. Consequently, pensions
fall in scenario 2 as ζ is reduced from 50.0% to 23.5%. In scenario 3, agents retire at age 71 if they
15Appendix 8.4.1 has the case where this reform is not anticipated.
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are born after 2010. Therefore, the burden on the pension system declines significantly during
2055-59 when the cohorts of the 66 through 70-year old workers remain in the labor market.
During this period, the effective labor supply increases (see upper right picture of Figure 4) and
the dependency ratio falls. The social security contribution rates in the new steady states amount
to 14.8%, 7.0%, and 11.2% in the scenarios 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
In the scenarios 2 and 3, the lower social security contribution rates also increase the incentives
to supply labor as the net wage rate increases and the substitution effect dominates the income
effect. Therefore, the aggregate supply of effective labor increases. In scenario 2, households
also accumulate higher savings for old age, while in scenario 3 households accumulate savings
over a longer working life. As a consequence, savings are also much higher in the scenarios 2
and 3. Since both savings and the labor force increase, the net effect on the capital intensity is
ambiguous. As can be seen from the upper left picture in Figure 4, the capital intensity is higher
in scenario 2 than in the benchmark case, while it is approximately equal in the benchmark case
and in the scenario 3 with the exception of the period 2055-70.
In all three scenarios, the evolution of the growth rate of technological knowledge q mimics
the evolution of K̃. Therefore, the long-run change in q is largest in scenario 2 that keeps the
contribution rate τb constant after 2010. As can be seen from Figure 5, qt rises from 1.71% during
1990-2000 to 3.06% in 2200.16 In both scenarios 1 and 3, qt is approximately at 2.53% in 2200.
Since in 2200 the transition is almost complete we may interpret these numbers as the steady-state
growth rates of the respective scenarios. Then, the calibration exercise confirms the qualitative
predictions of Proposition 3: the effect of the demographic transition on the steady-state growth
rate of the economy is larger under a constant contribution rate (scenario 2) than under a constant
replacement rate (scenario 1).
Summing up, we state as our second main result that the design of the pension system may have
large quantitative effects on the economy’s growth rate.
16However, even though the growth rate increases significantly in scenario 2, it takes another 169 years until the
absolute level of the pensions overtakes the one in the benchmark case. The effect of the lower replacement rate
dominates and lasts for many decades. For example in 2100, pensions are still 20.9% lower in scenario 2 than compared
to the benchmark.
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Figure 4: Transition Dynamics for Different Public Pension Reform Scenarios under Endogenous
Growth
6.2 Welfare under Endogenous and Exogenous Growth
This section addresses two questions. First, we ask how the three pension reform designs compare
in terms of welfare. Second, we want to know how the ranking of these proposals depends on
whether the growth rate is endogenous or exogenous. Our results suggest that such a ranking
can be established and that the negligence of growth rate effects of the social security system
matters for the rank order of the proposals.17
17In Appendix 8.3, we study the welfare role of social security in the steady state with exogenous growth and
find that social security is welfare-improving if the replacement ratio ζ is not too high. In particular, the optimal
replacement ratio in the final steady state is found to be equal to 23.0%.
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Figure 5: Growth Rate Effects of Different Public Pension Reform Scenarios
To address these questions, we hypothesize that the average newborn of each generation knows
her lifetime utility associated with a life under each scenario. Equipped with this knowledge, she
is able to rank the scenarios according to the lifetime utility they deliver. Figure 6 displays this
welfare ranking for each generation born between 1960 and 2050. To provide an interpretable
measure of welfare, the vertical axis states the consumption equivalent change relative to the
benchmark economy with endogenous growth and a constant replacement rate. In other words,
for all 3 scenarios it states the percentage change of the life-time consumption profile for the
average newborn that is necessary to make her indifferent to a life in the benchmark economy.18
Obviously, the welfare effects are large and public pension reform matters. For example, consider
the generation born in the year 2050. The compensation in consumption necessary to make the
average newborn indifferent between the benchmark economy and the economy with a constant
contribution rate amounts to 21.2% of total lifetime consumption, the difference between the
upper broken line and the solid horizontal line at 2050. Of course, these huge welfare effects
represent differences in the growth effects of the individual pension reforms.
Our results with regard to the welfare effects of the public pension reform can be summarized as
follows:
18Similarly, de Nardi, İmrohoroğlu, and Sargent (1999) use wealth equivalent changes.
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Figure 6: Welfare of Newborn Generations – Consumption Equivalent Change
1. Under a constant social security contribution rate from 2011 onwards, all agents born after
1986 benefit. The welfare effects are quantitatively substantial. While the losses for the
generations born between 1960-1986 are also significant, they do not exceed 1.7% of total
consumption; the gains accruing to the generations born after 1986 are large and increase
over time.
2. If the retirement age increases from 65 to 70, the welfare of all workers affected by this
change in legislation declines by approximately 2.4% of total consumption. This finding
suggest that an increase in the age of retirement is not a worthwhile policy.
In Appendix 8.4.2 we compare the effect of pension reform proposals under endogenous and
exogenous growth. This comparison shows that the quantitative welfare effects of public pension
reform proposals are much larger when growth is endogenous. Moreover, we find that quantita-
tive welfare results may depend on the assumption of endogenous or exogenous growth.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In an economy where the production technology is endogenous, the investment decisions of firms
are guided by profit incentives. The evolution of the labor force, taken as exogenous by firms, is
then an important determinant of aggregate investment and growth. Moreover, a declining labor
force also affects an economy’s ability to save and invest. The purpose of the present paper is
to study the interdependency of these aspects in a dynamic general equilibrium model and to
assess quantitatively the resulting effects on economic growth, pensions, and welfare for the US
economy.
We find that, as a consequence of the demographic transition, the US labor productivity growth
rate increases from 1.74% (1.82%) during 1990-2000 to 2.41% (2.81%) in 2100 if the pension re-
placement rate (contribution rate) is kept at its current level. From a policy perspective, we find
that the current pension system dominates a reform that increases the age of retirement. Switch-
ing to a constant contribution rate after 2010 generates winners and losers: welfare decreases for
all generations born until 1986 and increases for all generations born after 1986. Overall, these
results reflect the insight that the institutional characteristics of the pension system affect the rela-
tive scarcity of labor with respect to capital and, thereby, the incentives to engage in labor-saving
technical change. At the conceptual level, our results suggest that allowing for TFP growth to be
endogenous affects both the positive and the normative implications of large-scale OLG models
employed to study policy reform proposals of the social security system.
Our results are subject to several caveats. They include the following. First, our analysis assumes
a constant labor force participation rate. However, over the last three decades, this rate has
increased in the US from 58.9% in 1966 to 67.1% in 1998. Since 1998, it has declined to 66.0% in
2005 basically due to cyclical effects (see, McEwen, Orrenius, and Wynne (2005)). Intuitively, the
labor force participation rate is likely to depend on the demographic transition and the design of
the public pension system. While a rising participation rate reduces the relative scarcity of labor
it is likely to increase aggregate savings and capital accumulation through a rise in the economy’s
wage incomes. The net effect on investment incentives is hitherto undetermined.
Second, we study pension reforms in a closed economy. However, globalization and market
liberalization in many emerging countries, notably China and India, account for a rising global
labor force. As a matter of fact, population aging is already a predominant phenomenon in many
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of these countries including China, Japan, and Europe. In an open economy, these developments
are likely to affect wages and interest rates in the US. While immigration to the US renders labor
more abundant, capital inflows make it scarcer.19 Krüger and Ludwig (2007) find that the decline
in the labor force in Europe and Japan implies a small increase of the US relative price of labor.
Allowing for the Hicks effect in their framework such a small increase is likely to raise the growth
rate of the US economy. The role of this channel for the assessment of pension reforms is yet to
be determined.
19Storesletten (2000) emphasizes the role of immigration to the US for fiscal policy. Recent contributions which
account for open economy aspects in the context of pension reform include Huang, İmrohoroğlu, and Sargent (1997),




8.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1




(1 + qt) i′(qt) + i(qt)
]
(1 + rt) (45)
Using the input requirement function (10) and acknowledging the dependency of pt and rt on K̃t
through (6) and (7) in (45) gives
(1− α)K̃αt
1− δ + αK̃α−1t
= v0(1 + 2qt). (46)
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is continuous. The remaining properties




stated in the Lemma follow immediately from (47). 
8.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We prove each statement of the theorem separately starting with Statement 1. Recall that i(q) =
v0q, δ = 1, and α = 1/2 such that K̃c = v0.
33


















ξ2 K̃t+1 + ξ3 i
]
+ (1 + g)
[
ξ2 + ξ3 i′ gK̃
]
, (50)







> 0, for all K̃t > K̃c. (51)











≡ φ′(K̃t) > 0, for all K̃t > K̃c. (52)
Accordingly, for K̃t > K̃c the function φ(K̃t) exists and is strictly increasing.

2. The steady state is determined by (33) for K̃∗ = K̃t = K̃t+1. First, we show that the right-
hand side, RHS(K̃), and the left-hand side, LHS(K̃), of (33) intersect on K̃ > K̃c at least
once if v0 < (ξ1/ξ2)






ξ2 K̃ + ξ3 i(g(K̃))
]
. (53)
This function satisfies RHS(K̃c) = ξ2 K̃. Moreover, it is bounded from below, i. e., RHS(K̃) >
ξ2 K̃ for all K̃ > K̃c, and strictly increasing for all K̃ > K̃c since RHS′(K̃) = Z(K̃) > 0.
Next, consider



















This function satisfies LHS(K̃c) = ξ1K̃
1
2
c . It is bounded from above, i. e., ξ1 K̃α > LHS(K̃) for
all K̃ > K̃c. Moreover, form (52), it is strictly increasing for K̃ > K̃c.
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Next observe that the condition v0 < (ξ1/ξ2)
2 assures that LHS(K̃c) > RHS(K̃c). Since
ξ1 K̃α > LHS(K̃) and RHS(K̃) > ξ2 K̃ for K̃ > K̃c, the two functions LHS(K̃) and RHS(K̃)
must intersect at least once. Since the two bounds intersect at (ξ1/ξ2)
2, there is at least one





that satisfies LHS′(K̃∗) < RHS′(K̃∗). At this K̃∗, we have
φ′(K̃∗) = LHS′(K̃∗)/RHS(K̃∗) < 1 such that this steady state is locally stable. 









. Taking the differential















) > 0. (55)
The sign follows since LHSξ1 > 0 and local stability implies LHSK̃∗ < RHSK̃∗ .










Turning to the relationship between K̃∗ and τb we need to take into account that ξ1, ξ2, and



























Again, due to local stability the denominator is negative. The first term of the numerator is


































From (54) the term in brackets is positive. Hence, it follows that dK̃∗/dτb < 0. 
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8.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1











8.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2

















where the argument of K̃∗ is (λ, τ̂b (λ, ζ)). To proof the proposition, we show that the term in
brackets of (60) is negative for all admissible parameter values.
Define ξ̂i ≡ ξi|τb=τ̂b(λ,ζ), i = 1, 2, 3. Using (56) and (57) we find that dK̃




























, and the one of K̃∗ is
(λ, τ̂b (λ, ζ)). From the definitions of ξ̂i, i = 1, 2, 3 and the fact that the derivatives are evaluated
































(ζ + 1 + λ)2
> 0. (63)
With ξ̂i, i = 1, 2, 3, one readily verifies that inequality (63) holds for all admissible parameter
values. Hence, the term in brackets of (60) is negative. With Lemma 1 the proposition follows. 
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8.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3








∂K̃∗ (λ, τ̂b (λ, ζ))
∂λ
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where the last step makes use of Proposition 1 and the fact that τb = τ̂b (λ, ζ). Since the last term
in (66) is positive the proposition is proved. 
8.2 Computation Details
As mentioned in the main text, we assume that the transition is complete in the year 2400. Fig-
ure 7 presents the complete transition from 1950 to 2400 for the capital intensity, K̃t, and the
endogenous growth rate, qt. These time paths suggest that the economy is in its new steady state
from 2200 onwards.
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Figure 7: Complete Transition in the Benchmark Economy
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8.3 The Welfare Role of the Pension Policy
This section addresses the welfare role of the pension policy.20 The purpose is to figure out
whether the presence of a pension scheme is welfare-improving in the benchmark calibration
of the US economy, i. e., for the model in Section 2. Moreover, we want to get an idea of the
approximate optimal pension policy in this framework.21
To approach this question, we focus on the setting with exogenous growth and confine attention
to the steady state of the year 2400. For this state, we compute the expected life-time utility of
the newborn who ignores his efficiency type. Using the calibration with ζ = 50% (which implies
τb = 14.8%) as our benchmark, we compute the welfare gains in terms of consumption equivalent
changes that arise for replacement ratios ζ < 50%.
Figure 8: Optimal Pension Policy
Figure 8 presents our results. The optimal policy is found to be given by {ζ, τb} = {23.0%, 7.60%}.
20We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the analysis of this section.
21In a model related to ours, İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu, and Joines (1995) show that the welfare gains from social
security are primarily driven by dynamic inefficiency. Therefore, social security is a more efficient way to finance
retirement consumption than private saving. These authors also point to the role of bequest income. With endogenous
bequest income, welfare gains from a social security system are lower. See, Caliendo, Guo, and Hosseini (2013) for a
theoretical refinement of the underlying arguments. See, Conesa and Garriga (2008) for the derivation of the optimal
social security system in a Ramsey setup. In contrast to our analysis, their analysis has an optimization over the entire
policy space including tax rates and debt policy.
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The consumption equivalent gain under the optimal pension policy compared to the scenario
without a pension scheme, i. e., where {ζ, τb} = {0, 0}, is equal to 3.47%. Hence, there is a
welfare-improving role for social security in our setup.
8.4 Sensitivity Analysis
8.4.1 Perfect Foresight versus Unexpected Policy Changes
Figure 9: Effects of Policy Announcement on Aggregate Effective Labor
In Section 6, we analyze the pension reform that switches from a constant replacement rate of
pensions relative to net average wages (ζt = 0.5 for t ≤ 2010), to a constant contribution rate
(τb,t = τb,2010 for t > 2010) in the year 2010. In our computations, we assume that the change in
the pension policy is fully anticipated. In this Appendix, we study the alternative scenario where
the households do not learn about this policy change until the end of the year 2010.
In Figures 9 and 10, the transition dynamics of the aggregate supply of effective labor, L, and
the capital intensity, K̃, are illustrated for the benchmark case (with constant replacement rate
ζt = 0.5 for all t), and for the two cases of an unexpected and an expected policy change involving
a constant contribution rate for t > 2010. If the policy change is unexpected, the time paths of
the two variables coincide with the one of the benchmark case until the year 2010. Afterwards, L
40
Figure 10: Effects of Policy Announcement on the Capital Intensity
decreases temporarily (the dotted line falls below the solid line until 2020), even though only to a
very small extent. Households increase their labor supply in old age at the expense of their labor
supply in young age because, in comparison to the benchmark case, the contribution rates τb,t in
old age are much lower so that the net wages are higher. As the substitution effect is stronger
than the income effect, labor supply in the later years of their working life increases.
In addition, households learn in 2010 that their pensions will be lower than expected. As a conse-
quence, they increase savings, especially in old age. Compared to the case with perfect foresight
(broken line), the capital intensity K̃ is always lower. As the growth rate, qt, is a monotone func-
tion of the capital intensity, growth is also higher in the case of an expected policy change. In
2031, the two transition paths display the maximum difference between the two growth rates
amounting to 0.27 percentage points (not illustrated). Clearly, the unexpected change in policy
results in a short and medium-run decline of the compounded growth rate.
8.4.2 Welfare Effects of Pension Reform Proposals under Exogenous Growth
In this section, we study the sensitivity of the welfare effects for the three pension scenarios if
productivity growth is exogenous and chosen such that the average annual total factor productiv-
ity growth rate during 1980-2005 is 1.05% (compare Section 4.3). In addition, we set investment
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cost equal to zero, i. e., i ≡ 0. As a consequence, the demographic transition has no effect on total
factor productivity.
Figure 11: Pension Reform Proposals and Exogenous Growth – Welfare of Newborn Generations
Figure 11 presents our results. Under exogenous growth, the increase in the retirement age
(broken line) does not unanimously decrease the welfare of all generations. Compared to the
benchmark case with a constant replacement rate (solid line), a higher retirement age introduced
for all those born in the year 2010 and later increases the welfare of the generations born during
1995-2009. For example, the life-time utility of the generation born in 2009 increases by an amount
equivalent to 0.6% of annual consumption. Welfare declines only for those generations born
during 1973-1994 and 2010-2037. In the long run, both pension reform proposals, i. e., a constant
contribution rate and a higher retirement age increase the welfare of the newborn generations. A
constant contribution rate after 2010 only harms generations born prior to 2010.
Compared to the welfare results under endogenous growth presented in Figure 6, the quantitative
welfare effects are much smaller here. More importantly, the assessment of each generation
concerning the preferred pension reform hinges on whether growth is endogenous or exogenous.
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